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The aim of this paper is to encourage debate about the left-wing media which evolved in 
South Africa during the first half of the 1980s. Its thesis is tentative, its conclusions 
provisional, but the need for review and reflection about the media practices of the period is 
pressing. The ideas for the paper came out of late-night sessions over light tables and letraset 
and from debates with media activists and students following the crippling press restrictions 
of the second state of emergency. 
By the mid-1980s nearly 30,000 activists had been detained under the various statzs of 
emergency and a considerable number of these were media workers of one sort or another. 
For the survivors of those heady years (when the end of apartheid seemed to be in sight) it 
was a time for assessment. We were left with many organisations crippled or banned, a 
much-reduced terrain of operation, and more questions than answers - fundamental questions 
like: What is mass communication? What is the relationship between media and 
movements, and between movements and technology? How do notions of class and the 
national democratic movement articulate? And even broader ones: What, in ideological and 
cultural terms, were the 1980s in South Africa? How much credence can be given to the 
state's claim that a revolution was imminent? In the turbulence of the times there had been 
little space for reflection. By the late 1980s it was essential. 
This study does not answer all of these questions. But, given that theories and conclusions 
are provisional, and that activists tend to colour their history from their own paint-box, three 
general agreements emerged from these discussions which took place in the Eastern Cape 
from 1987: 
radical communication practices (as I will define below) played 
a far greater role in the rise of this insurrectionary climate than 
is generally accepted by all but the state; 
the Left's willingness to press the new print technologies into the 
service of the struggle led to a qualitative and quantitative leap in 
the use of printed media; and 
the emergencies were the apartheid state's answer to a massive 
leakage of executive legitimacy. While the Pretoria government 
seemed to be winning most of the battles of the period by force 
and repression, it was rapidly losing the people to an oppositional 
culture which owed much of its reproduction to the repertoire of 
symbols which were daily regenerated and refined through popular 
communication channels. 
Indeed, it is only in the light of these conclusions that we can understand the shift of 
executive power from parliamentary to para-military structures, and why one of the main 
recipients of state restrictions under the various states of emergency has been the press. 
However, the left media cannot be considered in isolation from ideological shifts which took 
place at the level of the state and the commercial mass media systems during the period. 
The State: a Failure of Legitimacy 
The South African state, with its obedient television, radio and press networks, not only 
provided a focus for political opposition, but it also set the boundaries and indeed often 
provided the spaces within which (and over which) popular struggles occurred. It is 
generally agreed that a formative change took place at the level of state power in the late 
1970s. Some writers have characterised the shift away from the limited Westminster 
parliamentary system and towards a military-dominated elite within the State Security 
Council (SSC) as a "creeping coup". Certainly, changes in more than personnel occurred in 
the wake of the Muldergate affair* in 1977, and this paved the way for a shift in power from 
an elected parliament (and even fi-om the ruling party) towards an executive presidency and 
the so-called tricameral system of separate and unequal representation of Indians, Coloureds 
and Whites. 
The extended powers granted to the SSC from 1977 represented a massive centralisation of 
power. This was followed by a hawkish foreign policy and an attempt to defuse growing 
trouble in the townships by initiating reforms designed to win black allies and divide the 
disenfranchised by offering limited powers to elected township councillors. The content of 
the state's reform initiative was: 
to remove barriers to social mobility for the emergent black 
petit-bourgeoisie by offering opportunities for entrepreneurship 
and educational attainment at "white" universities; 
to incorporate a layer of skilled black workers into a "labour 
aristocracy" by offering a number of concessions, which 
included permanent leasehold and home-ownership schemes, 
relaxation of restrictions on occupational and geographical 
mobility and a modicum of self-governance in urban townships; 
to mobilise resources to upgrade the socio-economic conditions 
of permanently settled urban black residents, while 
simultaneously tightening influx control to seal off the urban 
townships and divert job-seekers into the burgeoning dormitory 
towns, located nominally in the homelands but within commuting 
distance of employment in white South Africa; 
to entice a significant majority of so-called Coloureds and Indians 
into central political apparatuses, albeit as junior partners, and 
to eliminate those racially discriminatory clauses in the existing 
apartheid legislation that attached opprobrium abroad but made 
little or no difference with respect to ensuring white privilege. 
Despite the heavy use of state TV and radio to sell these initiatives, the executive's failure to 
achieve a significant measure of support for them, or rather the success with which popular 
ideology and organisations systematically shredded them, was to throw the state into a crisis 
of legitimation and control. But, at the time, it opened up political spaces and provided 
issues around which the national democratic movement could organise. Another unexpected 
* The Department of Information was discovered to have misused large amounts of secret 
funds - among other things to finance a daily newspaper. State President B J Vorster and 
Minister of Information Connie Mulder were forced to resign, and Permanent Secretary 
Rhoodie unsuccessfully prosecuted. 
space which appeared was in liberal judgments handed down by certain sections of the 
judiciary emboldened by the growth of the mass movement and undoubtedly with an ear to 
overseas opinion. Although it can be argued that decisions against the state merely helped it 
to refine legal repression, the presence of judges clearly unwilling to rubber-stamp 
parliamentary decrees acted as a partial brake on excesses and often forced the state to reveal 
its hand in key cases against the press and the national democratic movement. 
The Guild Press: a Failure of Will 
A second player (by default) in the rise of the left press was the mass communication 
networks. In the 1980s they appeared to lose popular legitimacy at a time when their owners 
would have most wanted to influence the course of political events. This corresponded to 
(and partly gave rise to) an increase in the credibility of popular media. In order to 
understand this shift, it is necessary to ask what mass communication systems actually are. 
Although the communications corporations are in the business of making money, the media 
are, of course, more than merely business enterprises. They are also purveyors of class 
culture. Indeed, culture - the beliefs, mores, customs and maps of meaning of particular 
social groupings - is threaded through all social practices and is, in a sense, the sum of their 
inter-relationship. Journalists in the so-called commercial media - particularly those working 
on South Africa's English-language newspapers - often find it inconceivable that they may 
be writing anything but the obvious truth. But I would argue that, by simply conforming to 
certain professional practices, they work within the confines of a guild of understanclings 
which tend to serve the definitions of reality of the political elite. 
The routines of journalism, set within the economic and political interests of communications 
organisations, normally and regularly combine to select certain versions of reality over 
others. [l] Day by day, normal organisational procedures define "the story", identify the 
protagonists and the issues, and suggest appropriate attitudes towards them. [2] In this quiet 
fashion, not deliberately, and without calling attention to this spotlighting process, the mass 
media divide events into legitimate main acts and illegitimate sideshows, so that these 
distinctions appear "natural" or "common sense". 
The process by which the world beyond the reader's direct experience is made to look natural 
could be defined as a communications frame. At any moment the world is rife with events. 
Even within a single event there are many details and angles. Frames are, therefore, 
principles of selection, emphasis, presentation and exclusion, composed of tacit little theories 
about what exists, what happens and what matters. 
Communications frames, largely unspoken and unacknowledged, organise the world for 
journalists and enable them to process large amounts of information quickly and routinely 
and package them for efficient relay to their audiences. One of the most contested practices 
in framing is the empiricist notion of objectivity. Empiricism holds that the test of true 
knowledge lies in observation, experience or the collection of facts, and ignores the 
personality and culture of the journalist (in South Africa generally white and middle class) 
and the context of the informant. The canon of objectivity represents the common sense 
professional view of the guild journalist. [3] However, the cost of the empiricist defence of 
journalism is to render cultural determinations and effects quite marginal. Opposing 
frameworks are treated as a problem, a bias, distortion. Guild journalists attempt to strip 
them away, revealing the verifiable "fact" inside. 
This process is not merely technical. Guild practices are both professional and cultural 
blinkers which tend to narrow the circumference of the journalist's vision. For many (and 
particularly senior) journalists, this framing process blocked their political understanding at a 
time when popular insurrection demanded acute peripheral vision. And if these journalists 
saw little, media managements saw less. 
The broader problem here is that the way people act depends, in part, on how the situations 
in which they act are defined. Meaning is not a natural phenomenon, it is a social 
production. [4] For this reason, different kinds of meaning can be ascribed to the same 
events. The communications field can therefore become a battleground of definitions. For 
one meaning to win credibility, alternative constructions have to be down-graded, de- 
legitimized and marginalized. For this reason, the guild media - and its readers - were often 
out of step with the unfolding political drama of the decade. 
In the 1980s two other factors contributed towards the conceptual laagering of the white 
electorate. One was press wars and mergers which reduced the range of media voices, and 
the other was the escalating legal assault on the communications corporations by the state. 
Even before the state of emergency, the government's restrictions on communication were 
severe. This paralleled a declining interest by large financial corporations in print media as a 
source of profit, an escalating legal assault on non-state communication practices, and an 
increasing distaste on the part of the commercial corporation, Argusnimes Media for black- 
directed newspapers. 
Ownership of the South African media is among the most concentrated in the non-socialist 
world, and its management is generally among the most conservative in the country. The 
guild media are essentially commercial enterprises, intended mainly to make money and only 
secondarily to supply information. Newspapers, particularly, do not try to push up 
circulations to offer more people their package of information, but primarily to offer 
advertisers a wider audience. In return for this, advertisers will obviously pay higher rates. 
And it is not just any audience that is wanted, but one which can afford the advertisers' 
products. [5] This was one of the factors influencing the closure of the Rand Daily Mail in 
April 1985. With a daily circulation of 116,000, the Mail was the biggest morning paper in 
South Africa. However, most of its readers were black, and advertisers chasing up-market 
customers began transferring to more conservative papers. In its final year the Mail is 
reputed to have lost R9m. [6] 
The closure of the Mail was only part of a complex process of rationalization in response to 
both the recessionary climate and state pressure on the English-language press to "put its 
house in order" and to control "revolutionary influences" in its stable. The process is too 
complex to detail here, but was marked by very intricate footwork by the Argus Company. 
Highlights in these moves were the "phony war" between the Argus and South African 
Allied Newspapers (SAAN) which led to the closure of the Mail and the Express, and the 
launching of the Sunday Star and Business Day. [7] There has been speculation that the 
Mail - for years a thorn in the side of the Nationalist government - may have been closed as a 
trade-off with the state in return for the licensing of the profitable M-Net TV channel. [8] 
Other moves were the closure of the Cape Herald, Sowetan, Sunday Mirror and Soweto 
News, as well as a rationalisation of facilities between the Argus and Cape Times, the 
closure of the Friend and the pulling together of the Eastern Province Herald and Evening 
Post under a single managing editor and shared newsroom. 
Two processes seem to have been at work here. For some years Argusnimes Media, 
Nationale Pers and Perskor were moving their assets away from newspapers and into non- 
newspaper operations such as entertainment and TV. Argus income from these activities, for 
example, rose from 19 per cent in 1984185 to 32 per cent in 1985186. This included retail 
outlets, records, tapes, electronic advertising and TV. [9] The launch of M-Net, in which the 
three major press groups jointly invested R95m, was a further indication of this trend. In 
their remaining newspaper operations (which in 1985186 accounted for only 34 per cent of 
Argus income), the trend, according to David Niddrie, "manifested itself in waning 
enthusiasm, under mounting state pressure, for newspapers with a high political profile". 
This resulted, he says, in a move away from ownership of newspapers with the greatest 
growth potential: the black press. [l01 
This is not an unreasonable assumption. The Argus had its fingers burned by the banning of 
World, Weekend World (in 1977), and Post and Sunday Post (198 1). In December 198 1 
Home Affairs Minister Stoffel Botha reportedly told Newspaper Press Union representatives 
that the state found the successor to these papers, the Sowetan, unacceptable. At the time, 
the Argus is said to have contemplated selling both the Sowetan and its only surviving black- 
reader paper, Ilanga. 12anga was eventually sold, reportedly at an incredibly low price 
(despite being profitable), to Inkatha in April 1987. One reason could be that the Argus 
retained the printing side of the paper and divested itself of the editorial section, thus 
standing to make a profit without the pain of editorial conflict. It has also been suggested 
that the sale was again a trade-off, this time against the state keeping its hands off the 
Sowetan. [ l  l] In this context, the comment by SA Society of Journalists organiser John 
Allen, that "for twenty-five years newspaper management response to government pressure 
has been to feed the crocodile by making concessions", seems appropriate. [l21 
The point of this brief survey of the guild media is to pose the following question. With the 
massive growth of state TV and with state censorship increasing, white readership of 
newspapers falling, coverage of black issues in the English press declining and conservative 
corporations in control of 95 per cent of all paper sales, is it not possible that most whites in 
South Africa managed to live through a revolution at the level of popular culture without 
noticing it? More research is needed to substantiate this point, but if impressions count for 
anything this certainly seems to be the case. One anecdote does not serve as proof, but it is 
not out of place here. A French journalist who interviewed the white South African 
delegation of academics and businessmen which met African National Congress (ANC) 
representatives in Dakar in July 1987 was quoted as being astonished at their political 
ignorance of the context of political struggles in South Africa. "It brought homey', she wrote, 
"that Pretoria's frst weapon is ignorance." 
In the townships the position was different. As the news frame of the guild media moved 
further and further away from township reality, people there continued to watch TV, listen to 
the radio and read commercial newspapers. But increasingly the information which informed 
their choices and action came from elsewhere: from the popular circuits of communication 
and from understandings drawn from events around them which together added up to a 
fundamental social transformation at the level of popular consciousness. The vehicle for this 
new consciousness was increasingly to be the new Congress Movement. 
The Congress Movement: a New Political Force 
The period between 1980 and the declaration of the second state of emergency in 1986 was 
to see a breathtaking consolidation of popular sentiment and action around the symbols of the 
Freedom Charter, mass action and democratic organisation. In the ensuing battle with the 
state, forces which are best described as popular were to engage in a bitter struggle for 
cultural hegemony in townships, factories and schools - a struggle they appear to have won 
decisively. Indeed, history may show that the cultural gains at the level of popular lifeways 
and understandings far outweighed those made in direct political confrontation with the state. 
In the previous decade Black Consciousness had coincided (but did not necessarily intersect) 
with the rolling strikes of the early 1970s, and together these developments helped oppressed 
people to "dream dreams" about democracy and justice. Together, they fuelled the outrage 
over school overcrowding and the use of Afrikaans which was to culminate in the Soweto 
uprising. In 1977 the state banned eighteen organisations, together with the World and 
Weekend World newspapers. The following year new rhythms began to be felt. 
On the Reef the new mood was reflected in the pages of the black newspapers Post and 
Weekend Post, owned by Jim Bailey. Some journalists made contact with the exiled ANC 
and ran politically challenging stories. Weekend Post also republished the Freedom Charter, 
which had dropped out of sight for nearly twenty years. Then, in Cape Town in 1989, a 
boycott of Fattis and Monis products was called during a strike by the firm's workers. 
Women and youth foxmed support structures to organise the boycott and to assist striking 
workers. These were to become the United Women's Organization and Lagunyacro (later 
the Cape Youth Congress). 
The 1980s opened with school boycotts which started in Cape Town and spread throughout 
the country. Essentially, the boycotts were over the right to organise and a rejection of 
inferior education and poor facilities. Throughout the year labour action was also escalating, 
and popular demonstrations across the board reached a high point in May 1981, with mass 
mobilisations set to coincide with the Republic Day celebrations. 
The Congress character of the oppositional structures which developed during the period 
could be seen in meetings held in various centres in 1981. In Cape Town that November 
people streamed into the Athlone civic centre for a meeting few realised would symbolise a 
decisive shift in cultural struggle in South Africa. It was called by the Anti-SAIC (South 
African Indian Council) Committee in conjunction with the Cape Areas Housing Action 
Committee (CAHAC) to popularise opposition to the SAIC elections due the following 
Wednesday. The audience of about 1,000 was soon aware that this meeting was somehow 
different. Marshalls who ushered people to their seats wore khaki uniforms with green, black 
and gold ribbons. Around the walls, in huge stencilled letters, were the words of the banned 
Freedom Charter. Speakers reminded people of the traditions of resistance born out of the 
Congress Alliance, about the need for unity and the necessity to boycott undemocratic state 
institutions. They affirmed their commitment to work towards a united democratic society as 
enshrined in the Charter. As the meeting ended a large ANC flag unfurled behind the 
rostrum. 
Similar meetings were being held in Johannesburg and Durban, but the initiative had come 
from a national conference of more than 100 organisations in Natal the previous month. The 
Durban meeting was described by the student paper Saspu National as "an almost 
unprecedented gathering of progressive organisations. In many ways, the Anti-SAIC 
gathering paralleled the 1955 [Kliptown Congress] meeting ... and the key document (at 
both) was the Freedom Charter". At the meeting the Anti-SAIC Committee called for "links 
between labour, student, women's and community organisations and the establishment of 
independent community newspapers". 
This conference was, of course, not held in a political vacuum. The student boycotts and 
labour action had laid the groundwork for mass community action, and in June of that year 
the Cape newsletter, Grassroots, was calling for "joint action on all fronts". By that October 
unions and community organisations in Cape Town were engaged in joint talks, and 1981 
was remarkable for the proliferation of both community and student organisations. In August 
of that year representatives of twenty-nine trade unions met in unity talks which were to lead 
to the formation of the giant workers' congress, COSATU. Indeed micro-organisation was 
taking place rapidly all over the country. But until the Anti-SAIC campaign little evidence of 
the debate about a national context for these movements could be found in the left-wing press 
or elsewhere. For this reason the organisational clarity of the campaign was remarkable - and 
went far beyond plans to stall the SAIC elections. At the Cape Town meeting a small tabloid 
newspaper, the Call, was distributed, and was unusual in its strong and frequent references to 
the struggles of the 1950s and the Congress Alliance. The call, it said, "is for all democratic- 
forces to unite on the basis of the Freedom Charter ... for unity in action on a broad front ... 
for us to build on the lessons learnt in the 1950s - the decade of mass struggle - and to march 
forward without hesitation". 
The new Congress Movement thus placed itself squarely astride the history of resistance of 
the 1950s - and the parallels were obvious: the general accord with ANC principles, the 
Charter, the Congress salute, veneration for the old ANC leaders. Indeed, the whole 
repertoire of struggle of the 1950s was re-installed in the campaign structures of the 1980s - 
but, necessarily, there were differences. Structural conditions had changed. Levels of 
urbanisation were far higher than in the 1950s, and during the boom of the 1960s skilled 
black labour had increased dramatically. [l31 Under the hated but widespread Bantu 
education system literacy had soared. In the mid-1950s black secondary school attendance 
was a mere 25,000; by the early 1970s it was 300,000, and by the 1980s between five and 
six million. [l41 Yet, in the recession of the early 1970s, thousands had been thrown out of 
work and black pupils faced a bleak future. 
The carnage at the hands of the police in Soweto taught students important distinctions 
between mobilisation and organisation. The resulting leap in political mat~lrity among pupils 
l of the following decade, who had been given a new sense of their own power by the events 
l of the 1970s, is reflected in this letter to a newspaper from a Cape Flats mother: 
I am very worried about my child who is boycotting ... [he] 
gets up - he is only in Standard 8 - and he speaks to hundreds 
of people at the meeting. He is so confident of himself ... I can 
understand it all, but I feel scared. [l51 
The year 198 1 also saw the political banner and the electrostatic plain-paper copier come of 
age. The spread of rebellion was marked by the appearance of political banners on an 
I 
unprecedented scale. The townships, particularly in Cape Town, became festooned with 
slogans, from broad calls of "Unite, freedom for all" and "An injury to one is an injury to all" 
to reflections of immediate struggles such as "Two rooms is a living hell!", "We want 
electricity". They were produced faster than they could be removed by the authorities, who 
eventually simply gave up. The banners, together with the many student, community and 
union newsletters which were produced, had a mass politicizing effect in the urban areas. 
They gave the sense that "the people" were on the move, and the slogans located the enemy 
firmly in the camp of the government. The effect of the political ferment on all fronts, 
together with a high level of popular communication, was to create the context for broad- 




l But if the Anti-SAIC campaign was to launch the Freedom Charter and all that it represented, the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) was to draw it into the heart of popular 
resistance. By the time Dr Alan Boesak publicly called for its launch, plans for the Front 
l 
were well under way. Seven months later, on 20 August 1983, the UDF was launched at a 
rally in Cape Town, and by the end of the year it had come to represent more than 500 
l organisations. 
1 The launch became a symbol in itself: 5,000 people were expected but 12,000 came, 
representing an estimated constituency of 1.5 million. The rallying cry was mobilisation 
l 
against the new constitutional proposals and the so-called Koornhof Bills to set up 
l community councils in black urban areas. The UDF's historical lineage could be traced back 
I to the multi-class coalition politics of the Congress Alliance, but it emphasised that it did not 
l 
I consider its own organisational efforts to be a substitute for the "accredited peoples' 
liberation movements". [l61 Interestingly, the UDF did not formally adopt the Freedom 
Charter at its inception, a tactical move, possibly, to prevent it being labelled an ANC front 
and alienating its more conservative affiliates. Instead, it adopted a look-alike declaration 
and the slogan "UDF unites, apartheid divides". (The Charter was officially adopted in 
1987.) 
As a broad popular assembly of organisations, the UDF resembled less a political party or 
even a political organization than an "over-ground" legal vehicle for channelling political 
discontent. The Front's style of operation, its emphasis on democratic accountability, its 
popularization of songs and symbols of resistance, and a rapidly-developed sympathetic 
media network, served to catalyse a culture of resistance. Its red, black and gold badge 
(strongly reminiscent of a graphic in a 1981 Nusas publication [17]) spread like hot currency, 
appearing as buttons, posters, T-shirts, banners and newspapers throughout the townships and 
in schools, colleges and universities. [l81 
Alongside all this political ferment another, no less frenetic, tradition was maturing. In a 
series of meetings following the so-called Wiehahn legislation (which aimed to incorporate, 
and thereby bring under control independent black unions) the black union movement began 
to hammer out a common strategy. By 1984 it had been decided to create a new national 
federation, and on 30 November 1985 the giant Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU) was launched in Durban. During the first nine months of that year nearly half a 
million labour days had been lost to labour unrest. [l91 This figure was higher than for any 
previous year in South African history, and nearly three times the number in 1982, the 
previous highwater mark. 
The state, going through a rare phase of political leniency due to the delicacy of the 
constitutional adjustments, seems to have been caught off balance by the speed and 
sophistication of political and union organisation and - at the level of symbolic action - it lost 
ground rapidly among the disenfranchised. The latter, in a patchwork way, had begun to 
weld together a class unity which was to last for a few brief but heady years. 
The New Technologies: Actors Become Authors 
Another factor in the political groundswell of the 1980s was the new print technologies. And 
the decisive political aspect of these technologies was their mobilizing power. The older 
print systems - letterpress, photo-typesetting, offset litho - were costly and required 
sophisticated skills and organisational back-up. Indeed, from the workers' point of view, the 
means of ideological production until the 1980s had largely been in the hands of white 
support groups or "the enemy". For this reason, the struggle for the freedom of the press and 
freedom of ideas had been an argument within the white petit-bourgeoisie. For the masses, 
freedom to express opinions had been a fiction since they were, from the beginning, largely 
barred from the means of ideological production - the electronic media and the press. 
The print technologies of the 1980s were to change all that. In South Afiica the number of 
treated-paper copiers increased steadily throughout the 1970s, but it was the use of the Xerox 
plain-paper copier in industry and universities which started the photocopy boom. 
Photocopying was fast, relatively cheap and produced near-perfect prints in great numbers on 
ordinary paper. Another technological leap took place in about 1979 with the introduction of 
copiers which could expand or reduce the size of the image. A further advance of this . 
facility was the Minolta-type variable magnification copiers. 
Two results of the photocopy boom which followed were, first, the sudden appearance of 
cheaply reproduced facsimiles of books, articles and images, for the rapid dissemination of 
photocopy machines in universities, schools, libraries and businesses made copyright laws 
virtually unpoliceable. The second result was the discovery by artful innovators that with 
access to a typewriter and a photocopier one was in the pamphlet business. Photocopiers 
were miniature printing presses and this gave rise to a flood of pamphlets and newsletters 
which, with the addition of Letraset and pirated images, had reached remarkable 
sophistication by the beginning of the 1980s. Other technologies which supported these 
developments included: 
inexpensive printing processes for T-shirts; 
devices for the cheap production of "struggle badges"; 
the discovery that an image photocopied on transparent plastic 
could be magnified enormously by way of an overhead 
projector and thus traced on to bolts of cloth - in this way huge 
banners of great complexity and sophistication could be 
produced by groups of people with no training in art; and 
access to portable video cameras which were within the means 
of universities, schools and service organisations. 
Initially, access to the new equipment was through universities, but by 1985 it could be found 
in the offices of many service, political and labour organisations. The cheap technologies 
also aided the development of smaller newspapers, which could produce camera-ready pages 
for printers with little more than a typewriter, photocopier and light table. For the first time 
the new print technologies were making possible mass participation in a socialized 
production process, the practical means of which were increasingly accessible to the masses 
themselves. The only requirement was literacy. 
By the mid-1980s the next technological leap in media production was about to begin, a leap 
which was to leave the guild press floundering in expensive and cumbersome hot-metal and 
Atex systems which had cost too much to get rid of. The first IBM personal computers (PCs) 
found their way on to campuses in about 1984, and by the following year their use was 
widespread. In 1986 the first IBM clones (Tai-BMs) appeared with cheaper hardware using 
IBM-type DOS-based software. But the first publishing breakthrough came by way of Apple 
computers, a company which was to pull out of South Africa for political and economic 
reasons but which manufactured PC software with exceptional graphics capabilities. 
In 1985 journalists from the recently-deceased Rand Daily Mail got together to start a 
weekly tabloid with minimal funding. With some Apple Mackintosh computers, an optical 
scanner and a laser printer they were able to do the work of the entire editing and page make- 
up section of a normal newspaper in the space of a large desk - at a fraction of the cost. They 
were soon to add telefax, teletype and inter-city computer networking. The appearance of the 
Weekly Mail on the streets demonstrated the possibilities of cheap high-tech newspaper 
production - and ushered in a new era of desk-top publishing. 
Based on the Mail's experiences - and despite the state of emergency - other weeklies using 
similar technology began to emerge. This, in turn, created a pool of users able to support a 
growing network of independent news agencies based on the same data-transfer systems. 
These agencies, like many of the newspapers they served, became answerable to popular 
organisations and often acted as training grounds for community journalists. The actors were 
becoming authors. 
The New Media: Culture and Communication 
These, then, were some of the factors which may have influenced the development of what 
might be termed a culture of resistance. Popular culture has to do with the way the 
dominated classes develop distinct patterns of life and give expressive form to their social 
and material life experiences. It has to do with social relations, systems of belief, customs 
and patterns of social and political organisation and relationship through which the individual 
becomes a social individual. 1201 However, as I have suggested, the way people act, the way 
they are, depends in part on how the situations in which they act are defined or signified. 
Meaning is not given but produced, and is part of what has to be struggled over in any 
political contest. 
Popular communication systems - those means by which information and symbols are 
publicly communicated - also transmit social patterns and are, themselves, a social 
relationship. They are, therefore, also sites of struggle between competing definitions of 
social reality. To define communication in this way is to cast the net wide. Bassets lists 
popular communication forms as: labour and union press, neighbourhood press, university 
press, school press, literary publications, information bulletins and one-off publications, 
political manifestos, pamphlets and posters, and graffiti - to which one could add popular 
performance, community video, mass meetings, song and even funeral orations. [21] In this 
view, communications consist of more than simply facts and images; they are also symbolic 
and in a sense "hidden". This is well illustrated in an interview with the leader of the 
military chant often sung at political funerals (called toyi-toyi): 
Toyi-toyi is a way of communicating. Through it we know what 
is happening in the bush with the comrades who have left. You 
get to know about their training, their ranks and how they operate 
... guns down, guns up ... you feel as if you are in training ... you 
can see the people sweating when they are doing the toyi-toyi ... 
they feel involved. I'm one of the people who normally leads 
toyi-toyi. When I'm leading I feel like a general and I feel like 
I'm holding my AK ... in that way toyi-toyi makes you strong. 
People use it as transport ... the cheapest transport there is! [22] 
Indeed, it is possible to pick out three levels of complexity in popular communication 
practices during the 1980s which, to a certain extent, corresponded to the levels of 
organisation among the communicators. The first level could be termed information, which 
corresponded to a minimal organisational structure (speeches, songs, slogans, signs, graffiti 
and limited publications would be included here). A second level, propaganda, corresponded 
to the extension of the limited organisational groupings and their structured intervention in 
social conflicts. The aim of communication practices on this level was to agitate, organise 
and mobilise people on a scale ranging from a single community to a whole country. The 
main communications thrust here was through banners, flyers and, particularly, student, 
community and union newspapers. 
The third and more complex level of communication practices in the 1980s took place at the 
level of culture, and corresponded to the consolidation of numerous organised and relatively 
stable groups which together developed a political lucidity and distinct regional and national 
forms of behaviours and ways of life. I would argue that what was occurring in the mid- 
1980s was a shift in popular communication practices fiom mere propaganda to cultural 
struggle - a struggle which rapidly began penetrating deeper and deeper into the most 
sediment4 layers of the African population. By educating, organising and mobilising 
people, this struggle served to escalate the tempo of conflict, bringing them to a point where 
every blow by the state was a focus for further mobilisation. For example, when all other 
gatherings were banned, funerals became political rallies, provoking police action which 
gave rise to more funerals and more political meetings. What was being constructed was a 
class culture, and one which, towards the mid- 1980s, became increasingly self-conscious in 
the struggle for ideological hegemony. 
The growth of communications on this level was dependent on the spread of literacy among 
the African population. Black education, as many conservative whites had feared, prepared 
the ground for later social discontent on a number of levels. And as political mobilization 
increased, activists also developed organizational skills which fed into (and off) popular 
communications practices. The popular media of the 1980s which depended on this 
increased literacy was, of course, in no way politically neutral. It was the expression of a 
popular political project, and was making demands which would need profound changes in 
the state if they were to be met. On the one hand, popular networks of communication were 
articulating this project - making explicit the content of a new society - while, on the other 
hand, demonstrating the repressive nature of the regime. Naturally, these communication 
forms did not all speak with one voice. What developed was rather the movement of active 
community practices and forms pressing on each other, sometimes deliberately, sometimes 
not, in a process rich with contradiction and self-contradiction, but which together were 
developing a new historical world view. 
After an initial period of adjustment, affiliates picked up the popular line and soon their 
publications took on a distinctive UDF flavour. It is probable that the affiliates held to this 
"line" not because they were compelled to, but because their activists, the political 
spokespeople, journalists and media workers, had themselves become an organic national 
leadership - a proto-vanguard party held together by constant meetings around the country 
and linked to their mass constituency by the popular press. Or, to put it another way, in 
order to organise a mass movement, the organic leadership had to become media activists. 
This was not a unique situation, and is understandable considering the vast distances between 
centres, the great number of affiliate organizations and the levels of state rspression which 
made physical movement of activists perilous. In the 1950s GuardianlNew Age fulfilled, in 
part, a similar function for the ANC, which (at that time) was a collection of semi- 
autonomous regional congresses which only met once a year at the annual general meeting. 
In the 1980s, as in the 1950s, this ideological leadership was vital to the struggle. As Eddy 
Koch has pointed out: 
There is no automatic way in which a class culture is generated 
out of the experience of common material conditions. This may 
appear to be a spontaneous process, but in fact involves multiple 
levels of popular leadership, organisation and intellectual work. [23] 
It was for this reason that the circuits of popular communication were so vital to the 
unfolding political processes. The political turmoil of the time, I would suggest, was leading 
to the ideological transformation of a nation. On this level, culture became a site of struggle 
between the dominant class attempting to win a measure of consent for its reform process 
and the popular democratic and labour organizations articulating a range of alternative 
radical projects through mass meetings, local organizations and the popular media. 
In these circumstances, the Botha government did the only thing history had taught it to do in 
such circumstances: it declared a state of emergency, sent troops to occupy the townships 
and detained without trial thousands of activists, students and trade unionists. This 
authoritarian move did not correspond to a univocal strengthening of the state, however. It 
involved, rather, the dual aspect of strengthening-weakening, driving the extra-parliamentary 
political forces to the wall but at the same time sharpening the generic elements of the 
political crisis and exposing the shallowness of its social project. Given the withdrawal of 
white political parties from the positions of real power, and given the state's capillary 
penetration of more and more areas of social activity and its willingness to mobilize the 
coercive apparatus, the administrative structure stood exposed before the people's demands. 
The emergency therefore reduced, rather than increased, the potential for the regulation of 
conflicts, and forced the power bloc to move in a jerky, concealed manner by way of abrupt 
movements, direct clashes and short-term bargains. This contributed to an incoherence in 
government policy, marked by the lack of long-term strategy and the absence of an 
ideological or social project. By being forced into a politically reactive position by the 
popular forces, the state lost the political initiative. It is significant that if one studies the 
National Party's campaign in the 1987 (white) election, the opponent is actually the ANC, a 
non-competitor in the election. Sensitive observers had picked up these trends as early as 
1984. In June that year Denis Beckett observed that: 
the political leaders mainly have little idea of the political shape 
of the society they are trying to create ... it defies imagination 
that otherwise perfectly sane and intelligent people ... can 
honestly believe that an approach which flies in the face of 
every possible reality from arithmetic to zeitgeist holds out 
hope. [24] 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the weight of the emergency came down on all means of 
disseminating non-government ideology, sealing off South Africa from the world and from 
itself. In this context, it is necessary to re-evaluate the position of some sectors of the guild 
media. In the politically charged atmosphere of the mid-1980s these newspapers had begun 
to change. Confronted by the sudden legitimation of extra-parliamentary politics following 
the departure of MPS Van Zyl Slabbert and Boraine from the Progressive Federal Party, trips 
to Lusaka by the most unexpected establishment people, and a clamour of political 
alternatives from the most sedimented layers of society, some English and Afrikaans 
newspapers began to sense the failure of the state's ideological hegemony. Journalists found 
themselves caught between newspaper managements moving (and being moved by the state) 
to the right, and daily events around them moving to the left. Their dilemma was not assisted 
by the appearance of a leftish, up-market paper like Weekly Mail, which in economic terms 
should not have been there at all. The Mail was followed by challenging weeklies like the 
New Nation, South and the New Afrcan. [25] 
The mood of the developing cultural revolution from below was being filtered into 
newsrooms through increasing numbers of junior reporters recently sensitized by campus 
politics and radical student and other newspapers (a tendency which may have been 
reinforced by a vocal and compelling campaign against military call-up by the End 
Conscription Campaign, which was later banned). A factor in this process was the 
juniorization of newsrooms by managements wanting to save on salaries. (On the Daily 
Dispatch, for example, the most experienced reporter in mid- 1987 had no more than a year's 
experience.) But, like the judiciary, some newspaper editors were also becoming 
emboldened by the legal space fought for and won by the national democratic movement. 
Real news began to look possible. 
In all, dangerous fissures were appearing in the white power bloc and were being reflected in 
the newsrooms. The state found itself in an insurrectionary climate with a national and 
international press corps getting (in the state's terms) seriously out of control. In this sense, 
the state of emergency was an acknowledgement of an ideological rupture between the ruling 
classes and the masses as huge numbers of South Africans withdrew their support from 
official versions of political reality. 
In August 1987 this attempt was to be fine-tuned in tough media restrictions imposed on 
what the government described as the c'unconventional revolution-supportive press". 
Introducing the curbs, the Minister of Home Affairs, Mr Stoffel Botha, said the restrictions 
were aimed at publications which were guilty of "systematic or repeated publication" of 
material which had the effect of: 
Promotion of revolution or uprisings in the Republic. 
Promotion of the breaking down of the public order. 
The stirring up of feelings of hatred and hostility toward a 
local authority or security force. 
Promotion of activities of unlawful structures. 
Promotion of boycott actions and acts of civil disobedience. 
The curbs empowered Botha to close down a publication for three months and provided for 
the appointment of pre-publication censors. "Elements of the media", he told parliament, 
"are generating support for the revolutionary organisations through idolising and propagating 
their symbols ... and their symbols are those of revolution." [26] The editor of the Weekly 
Mail, which had been taken off the streets for a month by the curbs, gave the country a new 
word to describe the process. He claimed his paper had been "stofSe1ed". 
By mid-1988, however, Botha had come to the conclusion that his department's elaborate 
procedures for dealing with the press had not entirely silenced left-tending newspapers and 
news agencies. So in September of that year he transferred the power to seize and silence 
newspapers to the Department of Law and Order. (A year later he was to announce his 
retirement.) Crucial powers over the country's communication systems are now f d y  in 
the hands of the police. [27] 
But while over-regulation c l~ses  ome doors to the media, its very unwieldiness opens 
others. As Weekly Mail co-editor Anton Harber has pointed out, the confusion between Acts 
and emergency regulations, and between central state bodies, state officials and local 
warlords has created a surprising degree of space for newspapers with the will to publish and 
be damned. 1281 Equally, the new information systems used so efficiently by the Left are 
also the products of a developing industrial society. Today, modern data-transfers, fax and 
desk-top publishing have become integral to the workings of capitalist production and 
services in South Africa. So, while attacks on organisations, papers and people may, for a 
time, contain the left-wing information industry, quarantine regulations against its means of 
production are only possible at the cost of deliberate industrial regression. 
Notes 
The South African guild media is, of course, not monolithic and I am abstracting to a 
general level for the purpose of illustration. 
This is one of the reasons older journalists are so disparaging of fresh university 
graduates - the new recruits have not yet absorbed the tacit (ideological) rules of the 
game inscribed in daily newsroom practice. 
This does not deny the possibility of insightful journalism in the guild media. The 
South African press has produced some notable writers - most of whom seem to have 
passed through the Rand Daily Mail. 
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